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Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food
Regulatory Regime to Organic Food
Benjamin N. Gutman
[H]ow we eat determines, to a considerable extent, how the world
is used.
-Wendell Berry1
Green products are red hot.' This is the age of environmental
consciousness' and consumers are using their purchasing power to support
ecologically superior products and services.4 Information about the
environmental impact of these products is essential to these choices; hence
the rapid rise of ecolabeling as a form of green marketing.6 Whatever form
1. WENDELL BERRY, The Pleasures of Eating, in WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 145, 149 (1990).
2. See James Salzman, Informing the Green Consumer: The Debate over the Use and Abuse
of Environmental Labels, J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Spring 1997, at 11, 12. But see Roger D. Wynne,
The Emperor's New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific Certification Systems
Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal Certification Mark Programs, 14 VA. ENvTL.
L.J. 51, 122 & nn.294-97 (1994) (discussing the gap between what consumers say and what they
do).
3. See Thomas C. Downs, Comment, "Environmentally Friendly" Product Advertising: Its
Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 155, 155 (1992); Roger D.
Wynne, Note, Defining "Green": Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 785 (1991).
4. See Kimberly C. Cavanagh, It's a Lorax Kind of Market! But Is It a Sneetches Kind of
Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental Marketing Regulation, 9
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 133-34 (1998); see also JACQUELYN A. OTrMAN, GREEN MARKETnNG:
OPPORTUNITY FOR INNOVATION 7 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing environmentally friendly products
that were developed to satisfy consumer demand).
5. Ecolabels are a broad category of advertising claims about the environmental qualities of
products. See Kristin Dawkins, Ecolabelling: Consumer Right-To-Know or Restrictive Business
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they take, ecolabeling programs share the goal of providing consumers with
the information they need to make their purchases in accordance with their
personal ethical views.7
Consumers need assurance that these labels truly identify the products
that they wish to buy. Understandable concerns about deception, fraud, and
confusion have led to greater government regulation of the form and
content of ecolabels. In particular, both industry and environmental groups
have increasingly called for uniform federal standards as a way to protect
both manufacturers and consumers.8 A recent and controversial example is
the federal government's decision to regulate the meaning of the term
"organic" on food labels. The Department of Agriculture's proposed rule
was heavily criticized for misunderstanding the nature of organic
agriculture and was ultimately withdrawn?
In this Note, I argue that mandated uniformity is a poor regulatory
policy for ethically based decisions, such as the choice to purchase organic
food. "Organic" refers to a set of philosophical beliefs about our
relationship with the environment, not merely to the physical characteristics
of a product. Farmers and consumers, who grow or buy organic food for a
variety of reasons, do not always agree on the best ways to implement their
shared ethical commitments. Defining the precise "meaning" of organic
through uniform regulations deprives these people of the right to make
choices in harmony with their own beliefs.
Moreover, international trade law severely constrains the ability of
governments to regulate products on the basis of their production methods.
The Department of Agriculture's proposed organic rule likely violated free-
Practice?, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE
MEANS? 501,508 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 1996).
6. See John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the
Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 246 (1994).
7. Some of this information may also provide useful information about health or economic
efficiency to consumers. The focus of this Note, however, is the ethical dimension of these
choices. Purely self-interested motives do not fully explain these choices for all consumers. See
infra note 18.
8. See, e.g., Jaime A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental
Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 165 (1993); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Amendments of 1991: Hearings on S. 976 Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 102d Cong. 14 (1991) (statement of Deborah A. Becker, Vice
President, Envtl. Affairs, Kraft Gen. Foods) (calling for national environmental marketing
guidelines); id. at 16 (statement of Linda Brown, Vice President, Green Cross Certification)
(" [here is an urgent need for Federal legislation to regulate environmental labeling claims.");
id. at 18 (statement of Richard Denison, Senior Scientist, Envtl. Defense Fund) ("There is... an
urgent need for Federal action on environmental claims."); id. at 21 (statement of Rajeev G. Bal,
President, Webster Indus.) (" Where should be national standards preempting the States."); cf
George Richards, Note, Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products: The Need for
International Harmonization of Standards Governing Third-Party Certification Programs, 7 GEO.
INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 235, 257-58 (1994) (discussing the pros and cons of international
harmonization).
9. See infra Section lH.B.
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trade agreements because it imposed unilateral, parochial restrictions on
organic labeling. For these reasons, allowing heterogeneous definitions of
organic may be superior to mandating a single, uniform definition.
If multiple standards are permitted, can they be policed effectively? I
argue that kosher food, which must meet traditional Jewish legal
requirements, provides a model for how heterogeneous standards can be
maintained.'" Kosher, like organic, is a term that means different things to
different people. To accommodate this pluralism, the religious Jewish
community employs a sophisticated, privately driven labeling system to
alert consumers to the kosher status of food. There is also an important role
for public law enforcement in this regime, particularly trademark,
mandatory disclosure, and fraud laws, and judicial enforcement of
contracts. I conclude that the private-public hybrid" developed in the
kosher market should serve as a model for organic food and other ethically
based ecolabels. At the very least, government regulations should not
prevent private organizations from setting higher standards or producers
from advertising this fact.
Sections L.A and I.B introduce organic and kosher foods, and explain
that both are largely defined by production methods rather than physical
characteristics. That attribute is shared by ecolabels more generally, which
Section LC briefly discusses. Sections II.A and II.B, respectively, describe
government regulation of kosher and organic foods. Section II.C argues that
some of these laws may violate international law, which does not generally
allow distinctions to be made on the basis of production methods. Section
IIU.A discusses the regulation of kosher food under a private-public hybrid
model, and Section HLI.B considers whether a similar strategy could be
applied to organic food. Part IV concludes that in both cases the market, not
the government, should determine standards.
10. The similarity between kosher and organic food has been noted in passing before. See
Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating Recombinant bST,
22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 307 n.460 (1997) ("In general, a rabbi's blessing will leave little
physical evidence. Similarly, products labeled 'organic' or 'organically grown' are unlikely to
display any detectable chemical or physical difference from conventionally produced products.");
Talk of the Nation Science Friday (NPR broadcast, May 29, 1998), available in LEXIS, News
Library, NPR File (statement of "Benny" from New York City) (" [W]hy should the government
be involved in regulating whether something is organic or not? ... mhe government isn't
involved whether certain food is Kosher...."); Public Hearing on National Organic Standards
Proposed Rule, Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 26, 1998) at 37 (statement of Gene Kahn) (transcript on file
with The Yale Law Journal) ("Organics is a way of life.... It's similar to observance of the
Jewish dietary laws."); id at 65 (statement of Yorum Bauman) (" [Y]ou would go and talk to a
rabbi.., to find out what kosher means. And, in the same way, if you're going to find out what
organic means ... you should talk to... the people in this room."); id. at 212 (statement of Dave
Stanford) ("Revitalize private standards organizations. The system of koshering food has worked
very well."). None of these sources, however, analyze the analogy in any detail.
11. My use of this phrase should not be confused with Grodsky's "public-private hybrid
model," which is not discussed in this Note. Grodsky, supra note 8, at 207.
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I. ETHICAL EATING: ORGANIC AND KOSHER FOODS
This Part explains the meaning of organic and kosher, and it argues that
they share two important features. First, both are defined, at least in part, by
the methods used to produce and process the food rather than the
characteristics of the end product. Second, neither term admits of "a precise
and universally acceptable definition." 2 Organic farmers disagree about
what particular farming methods are appropriate; similarly, rabbis disagree
about whether particular foods are kosher. This Part concludes with a brief
discussion of ecolabels more generally and suggests that their basis-life
cycle analysis-also exhibits these two features.
A. Organic Farming: An Ecological Ethic
Ask a savvy consumer about organic food, and chances are that she will
talk about eliminating pesticides, fertilizers, and other chemical residues
from the finished product. 3 Indeed, widespread skepticism about the
efficacy of food safety regulations has spurred the demand for organic
food.14 The perception is that organic food contains less carcinogenic
residue and is grown with more care than conventional products. 5
Although this may in fact be empirically true,16 it is not analytically
necessary. 7 Moreover, this definition of organic-as residue-free food-
12. I. Garth Youngberg & Frederick H. Buttel, Public Policy and Socio-Political Factors
Affecting the Future of Sustainable Farming Systems, in ORGANIC FARMING: CURRENT
TECHNOLOGY AND ITS ROLE IN A SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 167, 168 (D.F. Bezdicek et al.
eds., 1984) [hereinafter ORGANIC FARMING] (referring to organic farming).
13. Cf Richard R. Harwood, Organic Farming Research at the Rodale Research Center, in
ORGANIC FARMING, supra note 12, at 1, 2 (noting the common assumption that "[o]rganic
agriculture is merely conventional agriculture without the use of chemicals").
14. See, e.g., Gordon G. Bones, State and Federal Organic Food Certiflcation Laws: Coming
of Age?, 68 N.D. L. REV. 405, 405 & n.2 (1992) (discussing the effects of the Alar scare on the
demand for organic food). But cf. OLUF CHR. B0CKMAN ET AL., AGRICULTURE AND
FERTILIZERS: FERTILIZERS IN PERSPECTIVE 212 (1990) ("The present problems [concerning food
and health] derive from composition of the diet and amounts consumed, not from the way food is
produced on farms.").
15. See Rick Franzen, Note, Will GATT Take a Bite out of the Organic Food Production Act
of 1990?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 399,406-07 (1998).
16. See H. Vogtmann, Organic Farming Practices and Research in Europe, in ORGANIC
FARMING, supra note 12, at 19, 29-30 (citing a Swiss study showing no residue in nearly all
organically grown food, but some residue in a significant portion of conventional food).
17. Natural and artificial substances, which may pose health risks, are present in the soil and
water that organic farmers use but are beyond their control. It is possible that a careful and
fortunate conventional farmer could produce safer food than an organic farmer. See S. REP. No.
101-357, at 299-300 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4953-54. However, the
accepted requirement that a field be organically managed for at least three years before being
certified, see 7 U.S.C. § 6504(2) (1994), may tend to lessen this possibility. Nevertheless, there is
no accepted scientific evidence that organic food is compositionally different from conventionally
produced food, see Terence J. Centner & Kyle W. Lathrop, Differentiating Food Products:
Organic Labeling Provisions Facilitate Consumer Choice, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 30, 41 (1996),
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does not fully explain organic practices, many of which are rooted in a
holistic ecological ethic encompassing the people, animals, plants, and land
involved in food production."8
Consumers choose to buy organic food for both health and ethical
reasons. 9 As a result, organic food commands a substantial premium20 due
to market factors and higher costs of production.' In this country, organic
farming has exploded into "one of the hottest megatrends in U.S.
agribusiness," with annual sales in 1996 reaching $3.5 billion.22 The
industry has grown at a rate of twenty percent every year since 1990,' and
it is predicted to quadruple in size over the next decade.24 Organic farmers
although many organic farmers and consumers continue to believe that it is, see, e.g., MASANOBU
FUKUOKA, THE ONE-STRAW REVOLUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO NATURAL FARMING 55-56
(Larry Kom ed. & Chris Pearce et al. trans., Rodale Press 1978) (1975) ("If you show a rice plant
from my field to a farmer he will know immediately ... that chemical fertilizer was not
applied."); Nancy Hobbs, They Taste Good, and They're Good for You, Too!, SALT LAKE TRiB.,
Oct. 14, 1998, at C1 (quoting a consumer as saying, "eating foods that aren't grown with ... all
those chemicals [is] probably healthier. It just makes sense."). In practice, many programs-
including the proposed federal rule-require residue testing, but this is merely seen as a way to
monitor compliance and discourage fraud. See, e.g., National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg.
65,850, 65,932 (1997) (proposed 7 C.F.R. § 205.430(d)). In fact, this testing has been severely
criticized by organic groups. See, e.g., Letter from Herve la Prarie, President of the International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, to Eileen S. Stommes, Deputy Administrator,
Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 3 (Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with
The Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter IFOAM Letter].
18. See Harwood, supra note 13, at 2. Like Congress, I take no position in this Note on
whether organic food is "more healthful, nutritious, or flavorful" than non-organic food. S. REP.
No. 101-357, at 293, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4947. In any event, health concerns alone
cannot fully justify the organic movement. The growing popularity of organic clothing
demonstrates this well. For example, Patagonia, a leading producer of high-quality outdoor
clothing, converted its line to organic cotton in 1996, splitting the cost with consumers. See
OITMAN, supra note 4, at 201.
19. See Kyle W. Lathrop, Note, Pre-empting Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation of
Organic Food Labeling, 16 J. CORP. L. 885, 890 (1991). A Harris poll found that 84% of
Americans wanted to purchase organically grown produce and half of them were willing to pay
more for it. See S. REP. No. 101-357, at 289, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4943.
20. See Lathrop, supra note 19, at 893 n.72 (noting that organic food often sells for double
the price of conventional food).
21. It is unclear whether organic farming is more or less economically efficient than
conventional farming. Some of organic farning's currently higher costs of production may be due
to the absence of economies of scale, see Youngberg & Buttel, supra note 12, at 175;
externalities, such as pollution costs, which conventional farming ignores, see John Bell Clark,
Impact and Analysis of the U.S. Federal Organic Food Production Act of 1990 with Particular
Reference to the Great Lakes, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 323 (1995); or increased labor costs to
replace mechanical production, see Harold F. Breimyer, Economics of Farming Systems, in
ORGANIC FARMING, supra note 12, at 163, 166. See also Franzen, supra note 15, at 402 (noting
the market effects of low supply and high demand on organic prices). Evaluating the truth of these
claims or their implications for social agricultural policies generally is beyond the scope of this
Note.
22. See Bruce Ingersoll, Agricultural Department Proposes a Set of National Standards on
Organic Foods, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1997, at B6.
23. See Peter Hoffman, Going Organic, Clumsily, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A23.
24. See Ingersoll, supra note 22, at B6.
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and consumers have created local, regional, and national organizations to
foster education and cooperation.'
In this Section, I will briefly describe some of the techniques for raising
organic crops and livestock, situating them within a larger ecological
philosophy. I will then discuss some of the disputes within the organic
community about particular practices.
1. Organic Agriculture
The organic movement has arisen largely as a reaction against
conventional faning.2 6 Thus, in trying to define organic agriculture, it is
useful to describe the salient characteristics of its conventional counterpart.
Conventional agriculture relies heavily on chemical fertilizers and manure
to restore the optimal chemical balance of the soil for particular crops.'
These products allow the farmer to sustain yields at a higher level than
would otherwise be achievable," but they have the potential to cause
serious pollution problems.29 Conventional practice also allows the use of
chemical pesticides to control loss due to weeds, diseases, and animals.3"
Many different products are available and regulated by federal and state
25. See National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,850, 65,914 (1997). Some link organic
farming to small-scale production. See Youngberg & Buttel, supra note 12, at 169. In their view,
large-scale, specialized agriculture is at odds with the organic philosophy:
There is an ecology to a small dairy herd that is permanently broken when herd size
increases. The small dairy fanner spreads manure on fields that produce feed crops for
the cows. Large dairies in California, Florida, and Texas feed grain hauled in from
Nebraska, Iowa, and Ohio. The animal waste must be impounded or trucked out, but it
is never returned to the fields where the feed grain was grown. The nutrient cycle is
broken, and the nitrogen rich dairy waste becomes a pollution problem.
PAUL B. THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF THE SOIL: AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 2
(1995). But see Youngberg & Buttel, supra note 12, at 175 (" [O]rganic farming is not precluded
on farms that are relatively large by U.S. standards.").
26. See generally NANCY JACK TODD & JOHN TODD, BIOSHELTERS, OCEAN ARKS, CITY
FARMING: ECOLOGY AS THE BASIS OF DESIGN 135-56 (1984) (describing the evolution of
farming from prehistory to the present, and situating organic practices within it). As a self-
conscious alternative to conventional farming, it can be traced back to at least the early part of this
century. See RODALE'S ALL-NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ORGANIC GARDENING 413-14 (Fem
Marshall Bradley & Barbara W. Ellis eds., 1992) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]; WNFRIED
SCHEEWE, NURTURING THE SOIL-FEEDNG THE PEOPLE 79 (1993).
27. See B0CKMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 21, 24, 26. Plants obtain many of the nutrients
they need to grow by drawing on the soil's reserves. See id. at 17. Although there are a variety of
natural processes by which depleted nutrients can be restored to the soil, the intensive agriculture
that produces most of our food generally depletes these nutrients faster than they can be
replenished. See id. at 192, 202.
28. See id. at 47.
29. See id. at 178-82 (mentioning air and water emission, solid waste, and occupational
hazards as environmental impacts from fertilizer production); James Stephen Carpenter, Note,
Farm Chemicals, Soil Erosion, and Sustainable Agriculture, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 190, 201-03
(1994) (discussing negative externalities to health associated with fertilizers).
30. See B0CKMANErAL., supra note 14, at50.
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law but remain controversial due to concerns about ecological32 and
human health effects,33 as well as the evolution of resistant strains of
pests.' The mainstream scientific and economic consensus is that in
general, the benefits of these products-increased yield and lower food
prices-outweigh their costs.35
The organic philosophy denies the dominant, instrumental view of
nature that drives these practices. Its rhetoric often evokes romantic images
of traditional, simple methods.36 Most of its practices focus on achieving
sustainability-not merely in the sense of a maximum sustainable yield but
rather "ecologically sound, economically viable, socially just and
humane."37 These practices may in fact tend to minimize soil erosion and
nutrient depletion, and they may therefore contribute to the long-term
economic health of agriculture.3 Yet the underlying objective of the
organic farmer is not simply optimizing productivity, but rather living in
harmony with the natural order.39 Eliminating chemical fertilizers and
pesticides is not necessarily the primary goal of organic farming; rather, it
31. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentcide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994); Connecticut Pesticide Control Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-46 to -661(1997).
32. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 29, at 213-16 (discussing the costs of pesticide
poisoning).
33. See, e.g., id. at 191-201 (discussing the health effects of pesticides, particularly on farm
workers).
34. See, e.g., TODD & TODD, supra note 26, at 143 ("Three-quarters of the insect pests in
California are insecticide resistant.").
35. See Carpenter, supra note 29, at 227. For the purposes of this Note, I am prepared to
assume that this consensus is correct. But see id. at 226-34 (disputing the conventional wisdom).
36. See, e.g., WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETrLING OF AMERIcA: CULTURE & AGRICULTURE
12 (1977) ("We have tried to escape the sweat and sorrow promised in Genesis--only to find that,
in order to do so, we must forswear love and excellence, health and joy."). As one poet writes:
ploughs turn over upside down
degrade neglect the soil
without a feeling and no touch
as hoes and fingers did
tenderly and merciful
Al Imfeld, "Ploughs of Progress," quoted in SCHEEVE, supra note 26, at 26; cf. Bones, supra
note 14, at 407 n.8 ("'Sustainable agriculture' and 'organic farming' are related terms but are not
synonymous. Sustainable agriculture should not be confused with a return to primitive or
nonindustrialized agriculture and the complete abolition of all agricultural chemicals.").
37. SCHEEWE, supra note 26, at 83 (quoting the definition of the International Federation of
Organic Agriculture Movements). The organic philosophy is often situated within a broader
framework of back-to-the-land consciousness, and supports the development of community-based
agriculture cooperatives to replace national agribusiness corporations. See, e.g., BERRY, supra
note 36, at 13, 194-95, 221.
38. See Carpenter, supra note 29, at 224-26.
39. Cf Lori Schiraga, USDA Proposal Would Weaken Organic Standards Measure, L.A.
TiES, Mar. 15, 1998, at B19 ("Organic farming is based on a system of producing food and fiber
in harmony with nature .... ").
40. Many organic practitioners recognize that "[n]ot all synthetics are detrimental, and not all
organics [i.e., natural substances] are beneficial" and that therefore each substance must be
evaluated "on the basis of its long-term effects on the soil, our health, and the environment."
Bones, supra note 14, at 405 n.1.
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is "maximiz[ing] the health of the soil."41 Added chemicals may be
unnecessary and unhealthy 4 -instrumental reasons to eliminate them in
many cases-but they also damage the environment and disrupt natural life
cycles4-externalities whose costs are only considered within an intrinsic,
ethical framework. In the words of Peter Hoffman, "Organic food is not
just about a product; it is a philosophy in which the process of production is
as important as the-final result."'
This characterization is fairly abstract, but in the words of Secretary of
Agriculture Dan Glickman, "[1f you ask people to actually sit down and
define what organic means, you get all kinds of different answers."'45
Organic farming has often been defined in the negative-that is, by
reference to what organic farmers do not do.46 The United States
Department of Agriculture defined organic farming rather expansively:
[A] production system which avoids or largely excludes the use of
synthetically compounded fertilizers, pesticides, growth regulators,
and livestock feed additives. To the maximum extent feasible,
organic farming systems rely upon crop rotations, crop residues,
animal manures, legumes, green manures, off-farm organic wastes,
mechanical cultivation, mineral-bearing rocks, and aspects of
biological pest control to maintain soil productivity and tilth, to
supply plant nutrients, and to control insects, weeds, and other
pests.47
Others define "true" organic farming to exclude any use of synthetic and
non-organically derived materials." The International Federation of
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), a worldwide umbrella
organization devoted to this issue, includes among the principal aims of
organic farming "allow[ing] everyone involved in organic production and
processing a quality of life conforming to the U.N. Human Rights Charter,
to cover their basic needs and obtain an adequate return and satisfaction for
their work, including a safe working environment" and "encourag[ing]
41. 1d&
42. See Carpenter, supra note 29, at 191-203.
43. See id. at 210-19; IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 3.
44. Hoffman, supra note 23; see also S. REP. No. 101-357, at 292 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4946 ("The 'organically produced' label... pertains to the production
methods used to produce the food rather than to the content of the food.").
45. All Things Considered: Organic Food Standards Announced (NPR radio broadcast, Dec.
15, 1997), available in 1997 WL 12834710.
46. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 26, at 414.
47. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ORGANIC FARMING 9
(1980) (emphases added).
48. See Clark, supra note 21, at 326.
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organic farming associations to function along democratic lines and the
principle of division of powers."49
Thus, the organic philosophy constitutes a "continuum of attitudes and
practices" rather than a concrete platform susceptible to absolute
defmition." Its practitioners do share, however, the goal of using natural
processes to the greatest extent possible. For example, many use natural
predators, resistant crops, and intercropping instead of chemical pesticides
to prevent widespread damage from pests.51 Rather than using synthetic
fertilizers intensively, organic farmers compost5 2 rotate crops, 53 plant cover
crops, 4 and leave manure-both animal and green-on the fields to
decompose instead of trucking it away or burning it These methods are
designed to prevent rapid depletion of the soil's natural nutrients. Most
organic farmers also try to preserve the soil structure by minimizing the
amount of plowing they do.56
2. Organic Livestock
Similar conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of conventional
and organic practices with respect to livestock. Here too, the trend in
modem agribusiness facilities is toward intensive, assembly-line
production.5 ' Animals are generally confined to tiny cages and raised
entirely in artificially controlled environments to maximize their size and
productivity at the lowest cost5 The squalor and barbarity of these
operations has been well documented. 9 Intensive production increasingly
requires the use of high doses of antibiotics to control disease' and
49. See IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 4.
50. Youngberg & Buttel, supra note 12, at 168.
51. See Carpenter, supra note 29, at 222.
52. See BocKMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 194 ("Composting is an aerobic microbial
process where the easily degradable organic substances are digested and converted to stable,
slowly degradable organic matter. The process generates heat and thus kills most weed seeds and
pathogens.").
53. Crop rotation "altemat[es] the types of crops grown in each field, rather than growing the
same crop year after year which depletes the soil and provides a breeding ground for persistent
pests." WHAT IS ORGANIC? (Stonyfield Farm Organic & Organic Trade Ass'n eds., 1998) (on file
with The Yale Law Journal).
54. Cover crops are planted between crops to replenish the soil's nutrients and to prevent
weeds. See id.
55. See id. Green manure is crop "grown for use as decayable material" that is then plowed
down into the soil. EDWARD H. FAuLKNER, PLOWMAN'S FOLLY 9 (1943).
56. See R.I. Papendick & L.F. Elliott, Tillage and Cropping Systems for Erosion Control and
Efficient Nutrient Utilization, in ORGANIC FARMING, supra note 12, at 69, 70-71.
57. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 96 (2d ed. 1990).
58. See, e.g., id. at 99 (chickens), 123 (pigs), 130 (veal).
59. See generally JOHN BRYANT, FETTERED KINGDOMS 27-37 (rev. ed. 1990); ROBERT
GARNER, ANIMALS, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 93-117 (1993); SINGER, supra note 57, at 95-157.
60. See Jim Mason, Brave New Farm?, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 89, 99-100 (Peter Singer
ed., 1985).
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hormones to stimulate growth.61 Poultry are often debeaked,62 and veal are
so confined as to be physically unable to rotate their bodies.63 Most often,
these facilities cannot accommodate in an ecologically sound and
productive manner the huge volume of animal waste produced. To ship the
manure to the fields where the feed was grown is generally not
economically feasible, so it often ends up as a pollution problem rather than
a useful nutrient source.'
Organic livestock practice avoids gratuitously using artificial processes
such as antibiotics, and it requires the use of organic feed.6' It also
emphasizes the importance of treating the animals humanely.66 Cattle are
allowed to graze, and poultry are raised free-range. Organic operations are
often less specialized and are peripheral to an agricultural farm that can
provide feed and recycle wastes.67 As with crops, the organic philosophy
dictates the use of processes that (potentially) affect the finished product in
addition to those that simply comport with a broader ethic.68
3. Disputes About Organic Practices
Given the uncertainty that surrounds the meaning of organic, it is not
surprising that there are disagreements about the acceptability of particular
practices. Indeed, many practices, not all mutually consistent, are presented
under the organic or alternative agriculture banner.
One dispute concerns "natural" pesticides and fertilizers. While some
are comfortable using these, particularly when other methods fail, others
believe more firmly that only naturally occurring processes should be
used.69 Another difference arises over plowing and other soil-disrupting
techniques. Plowing is seen in conventional settings as necessary to aerate
61. See SINGER, supra note 57, at 138 (describing the use of bovine growth hormones to
increase cows' milk production).
62. See Mason, supra note 60, at 93.
63. See SINGER, supra note 57, at 130.
64. Cf. BERRY, supra note 36, at 90 ("If animals are regarded as machines, they are confined
in pens removed from the source of their food, where their excrement becomes, instead of a
fertilizer, first a 'waste' and then a pollutant.").
65. See Clark, supra note 21, at 342-43.
66. See IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 4 (listing among the aims of organic farming, "[t]o
give all livestock conditions of life which allow them to perform the basic aspects of their innate
behavior").
67. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 29, at 223 ("The integration of crops and livestock makes
possible sustainable practices.... Erosion and the use of pesticides and inorganic fertilizers are
reduced with these systems.").
68. See Schiraga, supra note 39, at B19 (arguing that organic livestock require organic feed
and adequate space for movement).
69. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 47, at 9 (excluding only "synthetically
compounded" materials), with Clark, supra note 21, at 336 (denying that natural pesticides may
be used by "true" organic farmers).
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the soil and to allow strong root systems to form.7" Many alternative
farmers avoid these methods, because they believe them to be wastefulT
and because they object to doing violence to the earth.72 Empirical evidence
might play some role in resolving these disputes, but it is also possible that
they indicate a fundamental split over ethical principles that does not admit
rational solution.
A more significant divide exists between mainstream organic and
biodynamic farming. The biodynamic movement is one of the historical
antecedents of the modem organic movement and shares its holistic
philosophy.73 In addition, however, it advocates the use of biodynamic
preparations, specially composted recipes meant to "restore the soil's life
force." 74 Particular emphasis is placed on the significance of spiritual forces
for agricultural production. Unconventional techniques also address pest
problems. 7
6
Certified biodynamic products are highly regarded in the organic
community because they comply with extremely strict standards,77 and in
fact command a premium over ordinary organic food.78 Biodynamic
farming is particularly concerned with promoting self-sufficiency and
70. See B0cKMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 84.
71. See, e.g., L.F. Elliott et al., Summary of the Organic Farming Symposium, in ORGANIC
FARMING, supra note 12, at 187, 191 (noting that plowing wastes energy and destroys the soil's
organic matter).
72. See SCHEEwE, supra note 26, at 81-82 ("[N]atural agriculture means no plowing ...
[Ujsing violence against nature causes human beings to have more hardship, to be tense and to
lead unnatural lives.").
73. See id. It was founded in the 1920s by Rudolf Steiner. See Letter from Anne Mendenhall,
Director, Demeter Association, to Eileen S. Stommes, Deputy Administrator, Agricultural
Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 1 (Apr. 27, 1998) (on file with The Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter Demeter Letter].
74. Miles Corwin, One Step Beyond Organic, L.A. TvIES, Dec. 4, 1989, at Al. One method
is to bury a cow horn filled with manure at the fall equinox; in spring the manure is dug up, mixed
into water in a particular swirling pattern, warmed to human body temperature, and then sprayed
on fields. See id.
75. See id. Advocates follow the astrological "cosmic rhythms," arguing, for example, that
leaf crops such as lettuce "should be planted when the moon is in a water sign such as Pisces or
Scorpio." Id. Crops are often sowed two days before a full moon to "exploit its gravitational
pull." Sonia L. Nazario, Are Organic Foods Spiritual Enough? Not for Everyone-Biodynamic
Farmers Employ Exotic Compost in Quest for Health and Harmony, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1989,
at Al.
76. For example, when snails attacked one practitioner's lettuce crop, "on a foggy morning
during a full moon, she collected five gallons of the slimy creatures, threw them into a pot of
water and stewed them for a month." Id. Apparently, this solution worked. See id.
77. See Mindy Pennypacker, Habitat-Saving Habit, SmRRA, Mar. 1997, at 18, 19 (listing
Demeter as one of four "reputable certifiers"); Letter from Aleen Rothschild-Seidel, on behalf of
Demeter Association, to Eileen S. Stommes, Deputy Administrator, Agricultural Marketing
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 2 (Apr. 28, 1998) (on file with The Yale Law Journal)
("Demeter certified products have a reputation in the organic community nationally and
internationally for being high-quality natural goods produced according to strict standards; the
Demeter community is known for being philosophically committed to the natural biodynamic
process.").
78. Corwin, supra note 74.
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community-supported agriculture.79 Most organic food, however, is not
biodynamically grown: "Biodynamic farming makes ordinary organic
farming look about as spiritual as strip-mining." "
In sum, while there is no consensus about the precise meaning of the
term, "organic" generally refers to a way of producing a food, rather than a
claim about its physical attributes. Organic agriculture may be concerned
with a wide range of impacts, from the depletion of the soil's nutrients to
the treatment of the people and animals involved in production.
B. Kosher Food: Spirituality in Everyday Life
Kashrut"t presents an analogous situation to organic food: It is based on
production and processing methods rather than product standards, and it is
subject to differing interpretations. In this Section, I introduce some aspects
of kashrut, and describe several well-known disputes within the Jewish
community about particular products.
The market for kosher food is also hot. 2 Sales grew by twelve to
fourteen percent every year from 1992 to 1997," and some estimate the
industry to be as large as $47 billion a year." Seven million people
regularly purchase kosher food in this country, and over 36,000 products
are available." Interestingly, less than a third of these kosher consumers are
Jewish.16 Most significantly, many mainstream foods-from Tropicana
orange juice87 to Oreo cookies---are now under kosher supervision.
79. See id.; see also Paul Rauber, Money Where Your Mouth Is, SIERRA, July-Aug. 1995, at
16 (referring to the BioDynamic Farming and Gardening Association as "the country's leading
promoter" of community-supported agriculture).
80. Nazario, supra note 75; see also Demeter Letter, supra note 73, at 1 (claiming that
"biodynamic agriculture is distinctly different from organic agriculture" and "cannot be
considered as only a variation" of it).
81. Kashrut is the Hebrew word for the entire body of Jewish dietary law. It derives from the
Hebrew kasher, which is the source of the English "kosher." See 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 26
(1972). Because of differences in pronunciation and transliteration conventions, the word may
also be spelled kashrus or kashruth.
82. See Joe M. Regenstein & Carrie E. Regenstein, Looking in on Kosher Supervision of the
Food Industry, 39 JUDAISM 408, 408 (1990) (detailing the growth of the kosher food market).
83. See Kosherfest '98, SUPERM iARKET NEws, Nov. 30, 1998, at 19.
84. See id.
85. See Frank Bruni, The Brave New World of Kosher, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1996, at B 1.
86. See id.
87. See Randi Feigenbaum, Symbolic Legal Battle: Dispute Between Kosher-Certification
Agencies Triggers Lawsuit, JEWISH EXPONENT, Mar. 27, 1997, at 20.
88. See Joshua J. Hammerman, The Forbidden Oreo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998, § 6
(Magazine), at 66.
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1. An Overview of Kashrut
Contrary to popular belief, kosher food has not been blessed by a
rabbi.8 9 Nor is kashrut designed to protect health." Rather, eating only
kosher food is seen as a way of elevating oneself spiritually.91 Although
kashrut is often thought to be no more than a prohibition against pork,
shellfish, and mixing meat and milk, it is a complex and detailed set of
precepts.
The rules of kashrut, like most Jewish law, derive from both biblical
sources92 and traditional rabbinical writings.93 They can be loosely
categorized as product-based or process-based, although the two are often
intertwined. The principal product-based laws are those forbidding certain
foods or combinations of foods. Of animals, only certain mammals,9 4
birds,95 and fish96 may be eaten.97 Blood is categorically forbidden,9" as are
89. Cf., e.g., Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are
They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (1992) ("The dairy ran out of 'Kosher for
Passover' labels but I assure you that the rabbi was here yesterday and blessed all the milk.").
90. See, e.g., ELi W. SCHLOSSBERG, THE WORLD OF ORTHODOX JUDAISM 55 (1996) ("The
food itself may contain considerably more than a grain of salt, plus cholesterol, saturated fats,
additives, and calories.... The Higher Authority does not guarantee either the nutritional
acceptability or the healthfulness of a product that meets every religious requirement of the kosher
laws."); Berman, supra note 89, at 4 ("Kosher doesn't taste any better; kosher isn't healthier,
kosher doesn't have less salmonella. Religion is not based on logic." (quoting the head of New
York State's Kosher Enforcement Bureau)). Some writers have suggested that the development of
kashrut could be explained on health grounds. See, e.g., JAMES TOWNLEY, THE REASONS OF THE
LAWS OF MOSES FROM THE "MORE NEvOcHIII" OF MAIMONIDES 304-05 (London, Longmon,
Rees, Orme, Brown, & Green 1827) (" [A]lI those kinds of food which are forbidden in our law[]
are unwholesome... For the flesh of swine is of too humid a nature to be wholesome... The Fat
of the Intestines... clogs the stomach too much, hinders digestion, and generates thick and cold
blood....").
91. See SCHLOSSBERG, supra note 90, at 54 ("Orthodox Jews eat kosher food because it is
good for their souls."). For an interesting discussion about the ecology of kashrut, see Catherine
Beth Sullivan, Comment, Are Kosher Food Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 201, 207-08 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Exodus 34:26 (meat and milk); Leviticus 7:26 (blood); Leviticus 11:1-44
(animals); Leviticus 22:8 (slaughtering).
93. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE HULLIN 115b (meat and milk);
BABYLONIAN TALMJD, TRACTATE ABODAH ZARAH 30a (wine). For a more general discussion of
the roots of Jewish philosophy and practice, see Maimon Schwarzschild, Pluralist Interpretation:
From Religion to the First Amendment, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447,450-57 (1996).
94. Mammals must both chew their cud and have split hooves in order to be kosher. Thus,
cows and deer may be kosher, but pigs (and hence pork, bacon, and ham) are not. See Leviticus
11:3-7.
95. Birds of prey are prohibited. Chicken, geese, and other domesticated poultry are
permitted. Because the Bible does not give biological criteria for identifying kosher and non-
kosher birds, most authorities agree that only those birds that have a tradition "through the
generations" of being eaten may be considered kosher. See YACOV LIPScHUnz, KASHRUTH 18-19
(1988). For a discussion of the controversy over the status of turkey, see Gerald F. Masoudi,
Comment, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CH.
L. REV. 667,670 (1993).
96. Fish must have fins and scales to be considered kosher. See Leviticus 11:9-12. For
example, tuna and salmon are acceptable; excluded are shark, shellfish, and, according to
Orthodox authorities, sturgeon and swordfish. Conservative authorities consider the latter two,
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 2351
certain fats.99 Also strictly prohibited is mixing meat and dairy products.' °°
Finally, special rules are followed on the holiday of Passover, when
leavened products may not be consumed.01
Process-based laws generally concern either the method of preparation
or the identity of those preparing the food. The former includes the rules
regarding the preparation of meat. Meat and poultry must be slaughtered in
a particular manner"~ and then checked for signs of disease on the internal
organs.0 3 In addition, the utensils and other equipment must be unused or
ritually cleansed before being used for kosher cooking."° Laws governing
associations with Gentiles tend to be more controversial and less
universally observed." 5 Among these requirements are restrictions on
which have scales as juveniles but shed them at maturity, to be kosher. In England, Orthodox
Sephardic Jews accept sturgeon as kosher. See Berman, supra note 89, at 8-9.
97. The Bible also identifies certain species of locust that may be eaten. See Leviticus 11:20-
23. However, the precise method of identifying the kosher species has been forgotten, and today
insects are generally not considered kosher. This prohibition leads to various inspection
requirements for vegetables. See E. EIDLrrZ, Is IT KOSHER? 195-97 (1992) (detailing inspection
guidelines for various vegetables). In fact, the movement toward organic and low-input
agricultures, which tolerate more insects in the food supply, has exacerbated this problem. See
Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 82, at 410.
98. See Leviticus 7:26. This law has lead to process-based rules to ensure the elimination of
blood. Most meats are salted and soaked. See generally LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 95, at 30-39.
Liver, which has the highest concentration of blood, must be seared by an open flame. See Sheryl
Julian, What? Kosher Foie Gras?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1998, at El (" [S]he flipped the liver,
left it for several seconds, then pulled it off the flame.... The rabbi examined it to be sure it was
browned and pronounced the foie gras just right. He speculated that this was one of the only times
'in the history of the world that foie gras was koshered."').
99. See Leviticus 7:22-25; Menachem Genack, Industrial Kashrut Supervision, 39 JUDAISM
402,406 (1990).
100. See Deuteronomy 14:21. This rule has been strengthened: Meat and dairy foods are not
even eaten at the same meal, although the precise degree of temporal separation required varies by
local custom. See LIPSCHTrz, supra note 95, at 42-43. For these reasons, certified kosher products
are often labeled "meat," " dairy," or "parve" (meaning neither meat nor dairy).
101. See Exodus 13:3, 6. Certain grains become leavened (or risen) when they come into
contact with water more than 18 minutes before baking. See SCHLOSSBERG, supra note 90, at 32.
For this reason, only specially prepared flatbread called matzoh is consumed on Passover. See id,
102. The trachea, esophagus, carotid arteries, and jugular veins must all be severed
simultaneously with one stroke of a very sharp and smooth knife. See Berel Berkovits, Challenges
to Shehitah in Europe, 39 JUDAISM 470,470 (1990).
103. Although certain adhesions on the lungs are considered permissible by most, meat
labeled glatt (Yiddish for "smooth") is certified as free from any adhesions, and some Jews
choose to eat only glatt meat. See Genack, supra note 99, at 406.
104. The laws of "kashering" utensils are complicated. Most metal utensils, for examples,
need to be boiled, but some must come into contact with fire. See Gedalia Dov Schwartz,
Kashruth-Problems and Solutions, 39 JUDAISM 427, 429-33 (1990).
105. In part, this may be due to the fact that they do not derive from Biblical sources, but
rather were instituted in the Talmudic period as part of a general campaign of separatism in order
to safeguard Biblical prohibitions. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE ABODAH ZARAH 36b;
cf. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781, 801 n.79 (1998)
("[D]ifferent attitudes toward mingling with nonJews are tied to disagreements over the
stringency of kosher laws, with Conservative Jews preferring more contact than Orthodox
Jews.").
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Gentile-handled wine1 6 and Gentile-cooked food. 07 On the other hand,
leavened food owned by a Jew during Passover is not considered kosher
even after the holiday.'
2. Kashrut Disputes
In interpreting the traditional sources of Jewish law and custom, each
community is guided by the legal decisions of its scholars, generally
rabbis. 9 There is no supreme authority to resolve any disputes that arise;
this "interpretive pluralism" allows multiple religious cultures to coexist. 0
Perhaps the most prominent divergences in interpretation are those between
the Ashkenazic and Sephardic"' communities and the Orthodox 12 and
106. Gentile wine was prohibited because of the fear that it might have been used in
idolatrous ceremonies. See Odelia E. Airoy, Kosher Wine, 39 JUDAISM 452, 452-53 (1990). Some
would extend the prohibition to wine handled by non-observant Jews. See id. at 454. Boiled wine,
however, was permitted because it was considered unfit for idolatrous purposes. See id. at 455.
Today, certified kosher wine is either mevushal (raised to a high temperature) or handled only by.
observant Jews until bottling. Id. It should be noted that different communities disagree about how
high the temperature must be raised for wine to become mevushal: The Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations of America requires a minimum of 168°F, but the Lubavitch Hassidic movement
requires it to reach 1901F. See ia. at 456. Similar restrictions are observed with other grape
products. See idL at 453. The Conservative movement does not adhere to these requirements,
except for wine used in sacramental rituals, because of the general absence of idolatrous practices
in this country. See id. at 457-59.
107. Most authorities require only that some part of the cooking be done by a Jew. As a
matter of practice, many kashrut supervisors consider it sufficient for them to light the pilot flame
for gas stoves and ovens. See LipsctuTz, supra note 95, at 69-70. Some adhere to stricter
requirements with breads and milk. See, e.g., 1 SHOLOM YEHuDA GROSS, KOSHER MILK IN
ACCORDANCE WIH JEWISH LAW passim (198 1) (arguing that the milk of Gentiles is forbidden).
108. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE PESAHIM 29a. This leads to the common practice of
"selling" one's not-kosher-for-Passover food to a Gentile prior to the holiday, to be repurchased
afterwards. See EmLIrz supra note 97, at 91.
109. See Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 786-87. However, some rabbis, acknowledged for
their great wisdom and learning, may be followed by many different communities. For example,
Moshe Feinstein's rulings on issues of Jewish law are widely accepted throughout the Orthodox
Ashkenazie world. See, e.g., I GROSS, supra note 107, at 63; Berman, supra note 89, at 8. Unlike
spiritual leaders in some religions, rabbis do not serve a ritual purpose. Rather, as trained scholars
of Jewish law, their role is to issue legal rulings on difficult issues.
110. See Schwarzschild, supra note 93, at 457; see also Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 786.
However, the Orthodox approach to precedent is highly deferential to earlier decisions, whereas
Conservative philosophy accepts that precedent may be reconsidered in the light of changed
circumstances. See Mordecai Waxman, Conservation Judaism-A Survey, in TRADMON AND
CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 3, 20 (Mordecai Waxman ed., 1958)
(" Orthodoxy has ... [in] recent generations rejected the right to any but minor interpretations ....
Conservative Judaism holds itself bound by the Jewish legal tradition, but asserts the right ... to
interpret and to apply Jewish law.").
11. Ashkenazic (literally, German) Jews are of Eastern European origin, and make up the
vast majority of American Jews. Sephardic (literally, Spanish) Jews are generally of Middle
Eastern and North African origin. A narrow majority of Israeli Jews are Sephardic, but they make
up only a small minority of American Jews. For a brief overview of the historical and
philosophical split between the Ashkenazic and Sephardic communities, see Berman, supra note
89, at 9 n.37; and Schwarzschild, supra note 93, at 457.
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Conservative"' movements in this country. ' ' 4 Although particular cases of
concrete disputes abound," 5 I will focus here on two examples: gelatin, and
legumes during Passover.
New food-processing technologies often present particular difficulties
for kashrut experts." 6 Gelatin is no exception. It is a thickening agent used
to make Jello, marshmallows, gel capsules, and a wide variety of other
products. Gelatin is an animal byproduct, generally derived from cows or
pigs."' Because it is highly processed, it is unclear whether kashrut requires
that it be obtained from kosher, properly slaughtered animals, and
furthermore whether it remains a meat product (and therefore not usable
with dairy). The vast majority of kashrut supervisors in this country do not
permit any gelatin." 8 However, the Israeli rabbinate allows the use of beef
gelatin," 9 and a few Orthodox rabbis in this country even permit the use of
pork gelatin. 2 Most Conservative rabbis accept all gelatins.' 2'
112. Orthodox Judaism adopts a highly traditional and legalistic approach to Jewish law. See
Berman, supra note 89, at 7. The label covers a wide variety of groups from the Modem Orthodox
movement, which seeks to integrate very traditional Jewish practice into secular life, to Hassidic
sects, which tend to favor more separate, closed communities.
113. Conservative Judaism encourages the evolution of traditional practice to fit a modem,
secular life. See id. For example, in the light of society's changing conceptions of gender roles,
women have gained greater access to participation in traditional rituals.
114. There are other significant movements in this country, such as Reform and
Reconstructionist Judaism, but these groups generally do not accept the binding nature of
traditional Jewish law in general, and kashrut in particular. See Peter S. Knobel, Reform Judaism
and Kashrut, 39 JUDAISM 488, 488 (1990). But see Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 786 n.25 ("In
practice, Reconstructionist Jews often follow kosher guidelines to some extent for the spiritual
values they believe doing so entails.... But even those who keep kosher are not as concerned
about technicalities as Orthodox people would be."); John Dart, Reform Rabbis Will Consider
Return to Kosher Dietary Laws, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at B 11. A full accounting of Jewish
religious cultures would also include discussion of Hassidic and other ultra-Orthodox sects.
115. See, e.g., supra notes 96 (swordfish and sturgeon), 103 (glatt meat), 106 (wine), & 107
(milk and bread).
116. See Schwartz, supra note 104, at 427 (noting that rabbinical guidance is needed to
reflect technological change). Of course, new scientific knowledge may also help supervisors
ensure the kashrut of foods, see, e.g., Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 82, at 413 (discussing
the use of mass spectroscopy to determine the source of vinegar), and provide new choices for
consumers, see, e.g., id. at 414 (discussing the possibility of using genetically engineered rennin
to produce kosher cheeses).
117. Gelatin is extracted from the bones and hides of animals by soaking them in various
acids and bases over a long period of time. See EIDLrrz, supra note 97, at 93. Gelatin could also
be made from fish skins, which would present fewer kashrut problems than beef or pork gelatin.
See Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 82, at 410.
118. See Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 82, at 410.
119. See id.; see also DAVID I. SHEINKOPF, ISSUES IN JEWISH DIETARY LAWS: GELATIN,
KrrNIYYoT, AND THEIR DERrVATvEs 7-92 (1988) (arguing that gelatin from kosher animals,
even if not properly slaughtered, is kosher and parve).
120. See Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 82, at 410.
121. In the early part of this century, Orthodox rabbis also accepted gelatin without
qualification. See SHEINKOPF, supra note 119, at 10-12. By 1966, major Orthodox authorities had
restricted kosher gelatin to that derived from kosher meats, which caused the leading certification
organizations to prohibit its use. See EtDLrz, supra note 97, at 93.
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Legumes present a difference that arises not from a dispute over the
technical requirements of kashrut, but from historical practices that have
become enshrined in the customary law of certain communities.
Ashkenazic Jews avoid certain legumes'23 and rice during Passover124
because they were traditionally stored together with (Biblically) prohibited
grains. Sephardic Jews, on the other hand, have no such tradition and
therefore consume these legumes.'25 As a practical matter, this difference
leads to two separate meanings of "kosher for Passover."
To conclude, kosher food is another example of a largely process-based
category. As with organic food, there is a lack of consensus about the
precise meaning of "kosher." Similarly, a broad range of concerns about
tradition, community, and morality can be subsumed under the kashrut
banner.
C. Ecolabels More Generally
The problems in defining kosher and organic foods are analogous to
those of setting standards for many ecolabels. Although some organic and
kosher practices directly affect the physical attributes of finished
products,'26 the vast majority of their rules address ethical concerns about
the way food is produced. Similarly, the basic tool of many ecolabeling
programs is life-cycle analysis, 27 a cradle-to-grave assessment of all of the
environmental impacts of a product." This analysis encompasses
externalities not reflected by market prices. 29 Relevant considerations
include the product's raw materials, production processes, use, and
disposal. 30 Thus, life-cycle analysis, like kosher and organic standards, is
concerned with production and processing methods.
The holistic vision of life-cycle analysis is somewhat aspirational.
Although life-cycle analysis highlights the need to consider tradeoffs,
122. Customary practices may gain the status of religious law. See SCHLOSSBERG, supra note
90, at 9.
123. In particular, they shun most varieties of beans. For a list of prohibited legumes and
grains, see Joe Regenstein & Carrie Regenstein, Looking in, KASHRUS MAG., Apr. 1995, at 49,
51-52.
124. See Genack, supra note 99, at 402.
125. See id.
126. For example, an organic farmer not using chemical pesticides is likely to produce food
with lower pesticide residue. See supra note 17. Of the kashrut examples discussed above, the
controversies over gelatin, glatt meat, wine, milk, and bread all concern methods; the disputes
about fish and legumes deal with products.
127. See Salzman, supra note 2, at 12. But see Church, supra note 6, at 259 (criticizing recent
green advertising for focusing exclusively on waste issues).
128. See Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54
MD. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (1995).
129. See id. at 1443.
130. See Amy Lynn Salzhauer, Obstacles and Opportunities for a Consumer Ecolabel,
ENvIRoNMENT, Nov. 1991, at 10, 13.
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difficulties in gathering and quantifying data limit its utility as a definitive
environmental measure."' Its inherent uncertainty allows for the possibility
of interest group capture.132 As a result, particular analyses are often
disputed. For example, an analysis by the National Association of Diaper
Services (cleaners of cloth diapers) concluded that cloth diapers have less
impact on the environment than disposables, but one commissioned by
Procter and Gamble (a manufacturer of disposable diapers) purported to
show that disposables are no worse than cloth.133 Consumer Reports, after
identifying the divergent assumptions employed by each side, suggested
that the choice be made on the basis of local environmental conditions. 34
The difficulties are not merely academic; policy decisions are often made
on the basis of these life cycle analyses.1
35
Ecolabels come in a variety of forms. They can be mandatory or
voluntary, single-attribute or multi-criteria, and binary or graded.136
Voluntary programs may be government sponsored or privately run.'37 Both
organic and kosher certification programs would be classified as voluntary,
multi-criteria, binary labels, so I focus on that category in this Note.
I. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF KOSHER AND ORGANIC STANDARDS
The market premium commanded by kosher food creates a strong
temptation, in the absence of external checks, to pass off non-kosher food
as kosher.3 8 The same is true for organic food.'39 In addition, because both
131. See Church, supra note 6, at 261-63; Dawkins, supra note 5, at 504; Grodsky, supra
note 8, at 221-24.
132. See Church, supra note 6, at 263.
133. See Planet Watch: Which are Best for the Environment?, 56 CONSUMER REP. 555
(1991).
134. See id. For example, the landfill scarcity in the northeast disfavors bulky disposable
diapers; conversely, the water shortage in the southwest disfavors cloth diapers, whose cleaning
makes intensive use of (and pollutes) water resources. See id.
135. See generally Church, supra note 6, at 264 (noting that in response to the disposable
diaper situation, "state legislatures proposed drastic measures, including diaper taxes, warning
labels, and outright bans").
136. See Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of
Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L.
205, 211 (1996). Staffin refers to "negative content" and "content neutral" labels, rather than
binary or graded. I use the more general terms to facilitate comparison with kosher and organic
foods, which are generally "positive contenf' labels.
137. ld. at 220. The leading private multi-criteria ecolabel in this country is the Green Seal,
founded in 1989. See Cavanagh, supra note 4, at 201. For a critical review of the program, see
Wynne, supra note 2, at 51.
138. New York became the first state to regulate kashrut in 1915, in response to the failure of
the newly appointed communal chief rabbi to solve the problems created by the "charlatans,
profiteers and outright crooks" who were running the kashrut industry. See Marc D. Stem, Kosher
Food and the Law, 39 JUDAISM 389, 389 (1990). Interestingly, this law also failed to solve the
problem, at least with respect to the slaughter of poultry, leading to the incorporation of the
Kashruth Association to certify poultry privately. See id. at 392.
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categories are defined by production and processing methods, it is generally
difficult or impossible for consumers to evaluate directly the truthfilness of
a producer's claims."4° This situation has led federal and state governments
to enact laws designed to protect consumers. In Sections II.A and II.B, I
describe the existing laws against kosher and organic fraud. I argue in
Section II.C, however, that many of these laws may violate international
trade law, which requires tolerance of heterogeneous production methods. I
conclude that these laws do not suffice to protect consumers of kosher and
organic foods.
A. Kosher Fraud Laws
At least twenty-two states have statutes prohibiting the fraudulent
representation of non-kosher food as kosher.'4' Most of these statutes define
kosher as "prepared or processed in accordance with orthodox Hebrew
religious requirements,"' 42 and mandate various disclosure requirements 43
and enforcement mechanisms."4 In 1925, a unanimous145 Supreme Court
upheld New York's kosher fraud law against a vagueness challenge."4 Of
course, that decision was handed down before the Court had decided that
139. See S. REP. No. 101-357, at 289-90 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656,4943-
44 (noting the "growing evidence that some conventionally grown food is deliberately mislabeled
as 'organic' by dishonest traders looking to cash in on the premium prices organic food
commands"); Bones, supra note 14, at 411 n.29 (claiming that supporters of California's
regulations point to the opportunities for "fraud and misrepresentation"); cf. Ingersoll, supra note
22, at B6 ("The proposed standards are likely to force many food processors to reformulate entire
product lines and revise their labeling and marketing claims. 'A lot of them have been getting a
premium for products that are half-organic or less .... ' (quoting Kathleen Merrigan, National
Organic Standards Board)).
140. Cf. Grodsky, supra note 8, at 150 (discussing the same problem with ecolabels).
141. See Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Comment, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass the Lemon
Test?: The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed Statutes, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 337, 344
& n.58 (1998) (listing statutes). Until recently, a federal regulation also provided the informal
view of the FDA that "kosher should only be used on food products that meet certain religious
dietary requirements." See Labeling of Kosher and Kosher-Style Foods, 21 C.F.R. § 101.29
(1997), revoked by Food and Cosmetic Labeling; Revocation of Certain Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg.
43,071, 43,072 (1997). In addition, a number of municipalities have ordinances on kashrut. See
Lindsay, supra, at 344 & n.58.
142. Lindsay, supra note 141, at 345. Some states omit the reference to the Orthodox. Id at
346. California has a more complex definition, requiring that "every Jewish law and custom" be
followed at all stages of production. Id. at 345 n.64. New Jersey's law, passed after the prior law
was held to violate the First Amendment, see infra note 215 and accompanying text, does not
define kashrut at all. See Lindsay, supra note 141, at 346.
143. For example, under Connecticut law, sellers of both kosher and non-kosher meats must
post signs in the window and over the meats declaring which type they sell. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-317(a) (1994).
144. All these state laws provide for criminal penalties. See Lindsay, supra note 141, at 346.
Some also allow civil actions, including private causes of action. See id.
145. Justice Brandeis took no part in the case. See Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U.S. 497,503 (1925).
146. The Court reasoned that the statute's requirement of specific intent to defraud alleviated
the need to define the meaning of the term kosher comprehensively. See id. at 501-02.
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the First Amendment applied to the states. 47 In recent years, two courts
have struck down kosher fraud laws as violating the Establishment
Clause 4' by creating excessive state entanglement with religion. 49
Commentators differ over whether these laws actually violate the
Constitution.' Most troubling is the fact that the laws privilege Orthodox
standards. All agree, however, that the state could not legislatively or
judicially resolve inter-factional disputes about kashrut."' Therefore,
kosher fraud laws permit all good-faith claims of kashrut52 and cannot fully
protect consumers' standards.
B. Organic Food Laws
State efforts to regulate organic labeling and advertising pre-date the
federal government's efforts in that sphere.'53 California, for example,
prohibits the use of synthetic materials"M and provides for certain inspection
and registration requirements. 55 Its standards are fairly lax in some
147. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ").
149. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995);
Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (NJ. 1992).
150. Compare Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 951 (1997) (arguing that kosher fraud
laws are constitutional), Shelley R. Meacham, Note. & Comment, Answering to a Higher Source:
Does the Establishment Clause Actually Restrict Kosher Regulations as Ran-Day's County
Kosher Proclaims?, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 639 (1994) (arguing that consumer protection laws do not
violate the Establishment Clause), Kristin Morgan, Casenote, The Constitutionality of New Jersey
Kosher Food Regulations Under the Establishment Clause, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 247 (1993)
(arguing that the law at question in Ran-Dav's County Kosher was not facially invalid), and
Sullivan, supra note 91, at 245 (concluding that "Ran-Day was wrongly decided"), with Berman,
supra note 89, at 2 (arguing that present laws violate the Establishment Clause and suggesting
alternatives), Lindsay, supra note 141 (same), and Masoudi, supra note 95 (finding violations of
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses). Other commentators have staked out positions
between these poles. See Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 809-10 (arguing that some state
enforcement might be constitutional under certain circumstances); Stem, supra note 138, at 400
(" [T]here is a place for laws against kosher food fraud, but their compass is significantly smaller
than current practice would indicate.... [P]rimary responsibility for ensuring the kashruth of food
belongs on the Jewish community itself.").
151. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 805 ("If the disputed instances are substantial,
the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit were rightly troubled by enforcement of
Orthodox standards of kosher."); cf Meacham, supra note 150, at 652 ("Application of a
regulation is unconstitutional when it requires resolution of religious disputes .. "); Morgan,
supra note 150, at 277-8 (" [R]esolution of disputes as to whether food is kosher has been
characterized as an ecclesiastical dispute, which civil courts are forbidden to resolve."); Sullivan,
supra note 91, at 239-240 ("The State refrains from enforcing the regulations to the extent that
Orthodox Jewish authorities might dispute a particular requirement.").
152. This is exemplified by the fact that kosher fraud laws generally require specific intent.
See Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 983. The Supreme Court relied on this fact in the Hygrade
decision. See supra note 146.
153. Gordon Bones cites regulations in 22 states. See Bones, supra note 14, at 408.
154. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110,815(p)(1)(A) (West 1996).
155. See id. at §§ 110,850, 110,860(b) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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respects: Pesticides and fertilizers of "natural" origin may be freely used, 15 6
and there are few other requirements to ensure the sustainability and
ecological balance of the practices (irradiation is, however, prohibited).
Nonetheless, the requirements are stricter in some ways than those of other
states, such as Texas, which allow the regulated use of some synthetic
materials. 5
7
As the market for organic products expanded on the national and
international scales, concern emerged that the lack of uniform standards
would impede interstate commerce and therefore slow the industry's
growth.' Interestingly, it was largely mainstream agribusiness groups that
provided the impetus for federal action; 59 however, organic organizations
soon joined the process to avoid losing their say on the outcome. 6 In
response, Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990.161
The Act's stated purposes were "to assure consumers that organically
produced products meet a consistent standard" and to facilitate interstate
commerce in organic food, 62 although its sponsors focused almost
exclusively on the former.'63 They argued that federal standards would
eliminate consumer confusion"6 by giving "growers and consumers ... a
clear picture of just what organically grown really means." 65
156. See Bones, supra note 14, at 413.
157. See id. at 412.
158. See All Things Considered, supra note 45 (statement of Dan Glickman, Secretary of
Agriculture).
159. See Bones, supra note 14, at 408 n.14; Felicia Busch, Organic Foods: What You See Is
Not Necessarily What You Get, ENvTL. NuTRrION, July 1990, at 1 (noting that the United Fresh
Fruit and Vegetable Association (UFFVA) led the demand for national legislation). The American
Farm Bureau Federation also called for a national standard. See S. REP. NO. 101-357, at 290
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656,4944.
160. See Bones, supra note 14, at 409 n.14; John Mejia, Industry Develops Organic
Definition, SUPERMARKET NEWS, July 24, 1989, at 19 (reporting on the worries of some that the
UFFVA's task force on organic food, which did not include anyone from the organic industry,
would not represent the best interests of the organic community). Today, most in the organic
community generally applaud the idea of a National Organic Program. See, e.g., Clark, supra
note 21, at 325 (calling the Organic Foods Production Act an "elegant and novel piece of
legislation"). But see Demeter Letter, supra note 73, § 1.1, at 1 ("Farmers did not ask for federal
regulation. Business interests did.. .business interests which want to make a buck by riding on
someone else's initiative.").
161. Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI,
104 Stat. 3359, 3935 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-22 (1994)).
162. 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (1994). The Senate's version had also included "encourag[ing]
environmental stewardship" and "provid[ing] market incentives to encourage the use of organic,
sustainable farming methods," but this language was dropped without explanation by the
congressional conference committee. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-916, at 1174-75, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5286,5699-700.
163. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. 1796 (1990) (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at 1811 (statement
of Sen. Conrad). Speakers generally only hinted at the interstate commerce rationale. See, e.g., id.
at 3078 (statement of Rep. DeFazio) (noting that it had become "extremely difficult to market
products across State lines"). The Senate Report, by contrast, identified interstate commerce as a
major factor. See S. REP. No. 101-357, at 289, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656,4943.
164. See 136 CONG. REc. 33,890 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
165. Id. at 3078 (statement of Rep. DeFazio).
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The Organic Foods Production Act requires that all products sold or
labeled as organic comply with standards promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture, who establishes a list of approved and prohibited substances
with advice from the National Organic Standards Board."6 The Act also
provides for inspection, residue testing, and documentation. 67 Although a
state may establish its own programs with more restrictive requirements,
any such requirements must "further the purposes" of and "not be
inconsistent" with the Act.168 No state label may claim to be superior to the
federal standards, however.169
The Department of Agriculture did not publish a proposed rule
implementing the Act until December of 1997."7° Most of the rule's
provisions were uncontroversial. However, the rule did not prohibit using
treated municipal sewage sludge as a fertilizer,' irradiation as a method of
preserving foods,' or genetically engineered foods.'73 In its "most
astonishing move," the rule forbade the use of other terms-such as
"antibiotic-free" or "not genetically engineered" 
-on labels. 74 Moreover,
it prohibited private certifiers from requiring adherence to higher standards
as a condition of certification. 7 5
Upon learning of these proposals, the organic community was
outraged. 6 Organic farmers, who themselves would continue to abide by
stricter standards, complained that the proposed definition would trivialize
their products and destroy the market for organic food.'77 Consumers
argued that they would no longer be able to trust the organic label 17--quite
an irony for a program designed to increase consumer confidence.
166. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6505(a)(1), 6517(a), 6518(a). Synthetic materials may be included if
they do not harm human health or the environment, do not have natural substitutes, and are
consistent with organic practices. Id. § 6517(c)(1)(A). Natural substances may be banned for
similar reasons. Id. § 6517(c)(2)(A). One commentator has noted that "Congress in essence gave
the Secretary of Agriculture a blank slate on which to draft the meaning of ['organic']." Franzen,
supra note 15, at 401 n.16.
167. 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a).
168. lad § 6507(b). The program must also be approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. See
id
169. See S. REP. No. 101-357, at 295 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656,4949.
170. See National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,850 (1997).
171. Seeid. at 65,893.
172. See id. at 65,884.
173. See id. at 65,875.
174. Hoffman, supra note 23, at A23.
175. See National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. at 65,952 (proposed 7 C.F.R.
§ 205.301(b)(2)).
176. See, e.g., IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 4-6 (arguing that genetic engineering,
ionizing radiation, and municipal biosludge are all inconsistent with organic practice).
177. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 23, at A23.
178. See, e.g., Schiraga, supra note 39 (expressing concern that the federal standards were
being set too low).
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Congressional opposition to the rule was significant. 179 After receiving
more than 275,000 written comments,18 the Department of Agriculture
withdrew the proposal for further consideration. 8'
For the most part, it was not the fact of uniform federal standards itself
that generated controversy, but merely the substance of those standards.
Indeed, many simply urged the Department of Agriculture to follow the
earlier recommendations of the National Organic Standards Board. 2 This
sequence of events demonstrates, however, the difficulty-if not
impossibility-of devising a universally acceptable definition of organic
food.
C. International Trade Law
For better or worse,'83 free trade is a fact of international law under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)8 4 and its side
agreements." 5 At its core, this regime is based on the principle of
179. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. H509 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Metcalf)
(arguing that the rule was "both overreaching and inadequate"). Thirty-eight members of
Congress urged the USDA to adopt stringent organic standards. See 144 CONG. REc. H4988
(daily ed. June 23, 1998) (statement of Rep. Kucinich).
180. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., National Organic Program Proposed Rule View Comments
(visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http:llwww.ams.usda.gov/nop/view.htm> (listing comment figures). The
Department of Agriculture received more comments on its proposed organic rule than any other
government agency has ever received on any public issue. See Hobbs, supra note 17, at Cl.
181. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA To Make Fundamental Changes in Revised Proposed
Rule on Organic Standards (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http:lwww.ams.usda.gov/news/orgrule.htm>
(reprinting a May 8, 1998 news release that announced the withdrawal). The USDA recently
announced that it will allow meat and poultry to be labeled organic while federal standards are
developed. See Marian Burros, U.S. To Allow Organic Label on Some Meats and Poultry, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1999, at A20. Previously, federal labeling regulations had precluded such claims.
See id.
182. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 23, at A23 (asking that the proposed rule "be scrapped
and rewritten in accordance with the original recommendations by the national standards
board .... "). But see Michael Colby, USDA's Organic Standards Rejected but the Fight's Not
over, EARTH ISLAND J., Summer 1998, at 42 ("The ultimate certifier for food products should not
be the federal government, but rather a relationship of trust among producer, consumer and
community.").
183. Compare Jagdish Bhagwati, The Case for Free Trade, Sci. AM., Nov. 1993, at 42
(arguing that free trade produces revenue for environmental protection and encourages efficient
use of resources), with Herman E. Daly, The Perils of Free. Trade, Sci. AM., Nov. 1993, at 50
(arguing that there is a clear conflict between free trade and sound environmental policy). For a
recent overview of trade law and environmental issues, see EDrrH BROWN WEISS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALLAW AND POLICY 1035-1102 (1998).
184. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See
also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsUtTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
185. The two most relevant to ecolabels are the Technical Barriers to Trade and the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures agreements. The Technical Barriers to Trade agreement mandates
that all regulations-including labeling requirements-be based on international standards, where
possible, and least trade-restrictive. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
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nondiscrimination: '86 Imports from party nations must be treated no less
favorably than "like products" produced in any other nation'87 or
domestically.'
In a number of controversial cases, GATT dispute resolution panels
have determined that products are considered "like" if they share physical
characteristics; conversely, production and processing methods may not be
used to differentiate products.189 For example, the United States could not
require all tuna sold in this country to be "dolphin safe," because the
method of catching the fish does not affect the product itself.90 The concern
is that environmental regulations, although perhaps having legitimate bases,
will be used as unilateral "protectionist" trade barriers. 9 '
This holding alone would suggest that any government labeling
program that employed production and processing methods not affecting
the product would violate the GATT. But surprisingly, several GATT
panels have seemed to indicate that voluntary labeling schemes would be
acceptable. 92 This murky jurisprudence 93 leaves organic and kosher'94
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994). Health standards are covered
by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures agreement, which requires all standards to be
necessary, based on scientific evidence, and least trade-restrictive. See Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994).
186. See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GAIT 245 (1994).
187. See GATT art. I. This is known as the most-favored nation provision. See ESTY, supra
note 186, at 245.
188. See GATF art. III. This is the national treatment provision. See ESTY, supra note 186, at
246. There are limited exceptions to the article I and III requirements, including actions necessary
for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, or related to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources. See GATT art. XX. These exceptions have been construed
narrowly. See David M. Parks, GATT and the Environment: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies
with Environmental Protection, 15 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 151, 156 (1996-97).
189. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839, 889-90 (1994) (Tuna I).
190. See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155,
195 (1993) (Tuna 1) (report not adopted by the Council).
191. Cf Dawkins, supra note 5, at 503 (" [P]roblems include ... biased criteria setting, with
most of the programs designed in the importing countries with the participation of domestic
competitors according to domestic perceptions of environmental issues."); id. at 504 ("As
ecolabelling becomes a matter of international policy, decisive inputs from captured institutions
could jeopardize its viability as effective public policy. Indeed, in such a case, many producers
may regard ecolabelling as a restrictive business practice with some legitimacy .... "); Franzen,
supra note 15, at 401 n.16 (" Since the board advising the Secretary consists of members from the
domestic organic food industry, it is highly probable that the final rules will favor the domestic
methods.").
192. See, e.g., European Community-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/R, para. 8.274 (June 30, 1997) (dictum) (" [T]he ability of any Member to
enact measures which are intended to protect not consumer health but other consumer concerns
was not addressed. In this regard, we are aware that in some countries . .. voluntary labelling
schemes operate .... "), affd in part, modified in part, and rev'd in part, WT/DS26/AB/R (Feb.
13, 1998); Tuna 1, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 203 ("Any advantage which might possibly
result from access to [the dolphin-safe] label depends on the free choice by consumers .... ").
One commentator has noted that the Tuna I panel only addressed the most-favored nation
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regulatory laws in limbo.1 95 There appears to be agreement, however, that
privately run programs would pass muster.'96 In the next Part, I will discuss
the prospects for such programs in greater detail.
IlI. HARNESSING MARKET FORCES To REGULATE
KOSHER AND ORGANIC FOOD
Most commentators have assumed that government regulation is the
only, or at least the best, way to protect consumers and ensure that kosher
and organic standards are upheld. Yet public regulation alone falls to
preserve the ethical pluralism that characterizes both the kosher and organic
communities" and thereby may run afoul of constitutional values and
international law. I argue in this Part that there is an alternative: The market
can dictate the standards in an inclusive manner. A model-what I refer to
as a private-public hybrid-has been developed in the kosher market. In
Section HLI.A, I examine this model and explain how it accommodates
requirement of the labeling program, and has suggested that the panel's failure to consider the
national treatment requirement lead to its approving the scheme. See Erik P. Bartenhagen, Note,
The Intersection of Trade and the Environment, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 65-67 (1997).
193. Compare id. at 67-68 (concluding that "all but a handful" of ecolabeling programs
could be invalidated), with Samuel N. Lind, Eco-Labels and International Trade Law: Avoiding
Trade Violations While Regulating the Environment, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERsP. 113, 140-41 (1996)
(concluding that government-sponsored voluntary programs are generally valid), and Staffin,
supra note 136, at 266 (same). The Committee on Trade and Environment, formed by the World
Trade Organization, has issued a thorough but inconclusive report on the subject. See
Bartenhagen, supra note 192, at 78.
194. That these are state, rather than federal, laws should not matter. See generally James T.
O'Reilly, Stop the World, We Want Our Own Labels: Treaties, State Voter Initiative Laws, and
Federal Pre-emption, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 617 (1997) (arguing that the GAIT might
preempt some state labeling requirements).
195. Two commentators have concluded that the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990
violates the GATT and its side agreements. See Terence J. Centner, The United States's Organic
Foods Production Act: Does the Small-Farmer Exception Breach the United States's Obligations
Under GATT?, 28 TULSA L.J. 715, 722 (1993) (concluding that it does violate the GATr);
Franzen, supra note 15, at 428-29 (concluding that the OFPA violates article III of the GATr).
The kashrut situation does not appear to have been discussed in the literature. The free trade
agreement between the Unites States and Israel specifically allows for kashrut regulations. See
Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, Isr.-U.S., art. 8, 24 I.L.M. 653, 659. It is unlikely that
any domestic kosher fraud laws would be challenged under the GATT, however, since they are
not generally eiforced in controversial cases; if they were, domestic courts would likely hold
them unconstitutional. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
196. See Lind, supra note 193, at 134-35. But see Veena Jha & Simonetta Zarrilli, Eco-
Labeling Initiatives as Potential Barriers to Trade, in ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION
& DEv., LiFE-CYCLE MANAGFMENT AND TRADE 64, 71 (1994) (suggesting that a state might be
held responsible for tacitly approving private ecolabeling programs).
197. In theory, the government might establish separate certification programs for each
specific set of values. For example, putting aside First Amendment concerns, kashrut standards
could be established for Orthodox, Conservative, Ashkenazic, Sephardic, glatt, "Jewish milk"
(i.e., milk produced only by Jews; see supra note 107), and all of their various permutations, as a
start. The administrative costs of any such proposal, however, are likely to be very high: Each
different standard would have to be formulated, enforced, disseminated, and updated regularly.
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heterogeneous standards. I argue in Section lII.B that it should serve as a
paradigm for organic food, despite differences between the kosher and
organic markets.
A. Private Kashrut Supervision
In the United States, the "laws" of kashrut are, for the most part,
privately enforced. 98 Religious organizations, national and local,199 contract
with food producers to supervise production and then certify the finished
products as kosher.2" The supervising organization often has a trademarked
symbol that appears on the labels of approved products. 1 Consumers, in
turn, choose to purchase foods certified by organizations that they trust.
202
The largest of these organizations, the "OU," 203 certifies products in fifty-
four countries,2 4 and accounts for approximately seventy percent of the
certified products in the United States.' 5 Today, there are more than 200
registered kashrut symbols used in this country.2'
198. See Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 787-88. Few prosecutions have been brought under
kosher fraud laws. See Sullivan, supra note 91, at 211-12; c Stem, supra note 138, at 399 ("The
kosher food laws are not "Blue Laws," nor... would they permit the State to act as a guarantor
of the kashruth of an establishment in the way that the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
does.").
199. See Berman, supra note 89, at 11-12. National organizations generally supervise only
large food producers with wide distribution, and local establishments usually receive local
supervision. See id.
200. Cf. Genack, supra note 99, at 404 ("Each company which receives OU supervision
adheres to kashrut regulations which are established in a contract between that company and the
OU."); Masoudi, supra note 95, at 695 ("Private rabbinical organizations allow the use of their
symbols through contract; any dispute between a purveyor of kosher food and such an
organization could be resolved as a contractual dispute, with matters of religious faith left to the
parties to the contract to resolve.").
201. See Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 82, at 415 (describing some of the well known
symbols). The symbol indicates that the product meets that organization's definition of kashrut.
See Masoudi, supra note 95, at 695. The letter "K" by itself cannot be trademarked, and so may
be used by anyone. See Genack, supra note 99, at 403. New York requires all kashrut symbols,
including K, to be backed by a registered rabbi or supervising agency. See id. The conventional
wisdom in the Orthodox community is that a plain K is not generally acceptable. Nevertheless, for
strategic reasons, some producers use a K even when a national organization is supervising-it is
much easier to switch supervision if the labeling need not be redesigned. See Regenstein &
Regenstein, supra note 82, at 421-22; cf. EIDLrrz, supra note 97, at I1 (noting that Kraft products
carry a K even though they are supervised by the nationally recognized "OK").
202. See Schwartz, supra note 104, at 427.
203. The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America is known colloquially as the
"OU" for its certification symbol, a circle with a U in it. See Genack, supra note 99, at 403.
204. See Rona S. Hirsch, Cutting a Deal: A Local Kosher Butchery Bows to Pressure from
Vaad HaKashrus Kosher Certification Organization, BALT. JEWISH TIMES, Mar. 28, 1997, at 18;
cf Linda Habenstreit, What's To Nosh? A Growing Niche Market for Kosher Foods, That's What,
AGEXPORTER, Sept. 1998, at 4 (noting that American certifications are accepted in many
countries).
205. See Berman, supra note 89, at 12.
206. See SCHLOSSBERG, supra note 90, at 52.
Ethical Eating
Each organization sets its own standards, based on the practices of the
particular demographic group whose recognition it seeks, and contracts
with producers to follow whatever procedures it deems necessary to enforce
these standards. In fact, the standards need not necessarily be limited to the
strict parameters of kashrut but can address any other issues of concern to
the Jewish community.' The system is based on trust, and the often close-
knit religious communities.. in this country can be quite unforgiving about
actual or rumored lapses.'
Kashrut organizations expend a great deal of effort to build trust
through providing information; this is supplemented by publicity from
many other religious organizations that care about the observance of Jewish
law.2"' Consumers also self-inform and rely on the reputations of particular
kashrut organizations. For example, Ashkenazic Jews avoid purchasing
food for Passover that is under Sephardic supervision because of concerns
about legumes and rice.21" ' Similarly, many Orthodox Jews carefully
scrutinize candies from Israel because of concerns about gelatin.2" 2
207. For example, the Star-K, a highly reputable organization run by Baltimore's rabbinical
council, ordered a boycott of a local butcher who used the New York-based OU for supervision.
See Hirsch, supra note 204. The issue was not one of kashrut-the council permitted the use of
OU-certified meats in other contexts-but rather ensuring the integrity of local religious authority.
See id Certifiers also commonly require Sabbath adherence. Cf. Cohen v. Silver, 178 N.E. 508
(Mass. 1931) (refusing relief to a wholesaler who was denied a permit to sell kosher meat by local
rabbinical authorities because he violated the Sabbath and refused to appear before a religious
court); HAROLD P. GAsTWiRT, FRAUD, CORRUPTION, AND HOLINESS 136-37 (1974) (discussing a
New York case where the defendant prevailed after being prosecuted for selling meat on the
Sabbath); Stem, supra note 138, at 399 (noting that kashrut supervisors, but not state authorities,
might appropriately require producers to adhere to the laws of Sabbath). This requirement can be
justified instrumentally (e.g., that Sabbath observance is necessary to enable constant supervision,
since a non-Sabbath observer could not be trusted to enforce the standards adequately) or
intrinsically (i.e., kashrut represents a larger ethical worldview, one inconsistent with non-
observance of the Sabbath). A final example is provided by Bazooka Gum, certified by the OU.
Concerned that the gum's accompanying comic strip "may reflect ideas that are not in keeping
with Judaism," the OU secured changes to its content. See Consumer Alert 68, KASHRUS MAG.,
Feb. 1996, at 16.
208. This, of course, can lead to problems for consumers outside of these circles who do not
maintain these contacts. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 91, at 243-44; cf Rona S. Hirsch, Kosher
Cooperation: A Local Kosher Certification Group Promises To Notify Non-Orthodox Leaders
When Kosher Crises Surface, BALT. JEWISH TIMEs, May 1, 1998, at. 1 (describing a plan to
disseminate information on kashrut issues via posted notices and pulpit announcements).
209. See Berman, supra note 89, at 12.
210. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 105, at 787-88 ("Local rabbis inspect stores and restaurants
and guide followers about which of those observe kosher requirements."). An example of
disseminated information is Kashrus Magazine, published five times a year by Yeshiva Birkas
Reuven. In its "Consumer Alert" section, it provides information about unauthorized use of
kashrut symbols, mislabeled products, and the supervision industry generally. See, e.g., Consumer
Alert, KASHRus MAG., Feb. 1996, at 6.
211. See, e.g., Pesach Consumer Alert 22, KASHRUS MAG., Apr. 1995, at 10 (warning
Ashkenazic customers to avoid relying on information in Sephardic Passover directories).
212. See, e.g., Pesach Consumer Alert 20, KASHRUS MAG., Apr. 1995, at 10 (warning
consumers that some Elite products sold in Israel contain gelatin).
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This enforcement regime, however, also relies on public law. Private
litigation (or its threat) provides an important tool for kashrut supervisors.
Supervisory organizations zealously protect their trademarks, which form
the basis of consumer trust."3 Contract law can also serve as a basis for
enforcement.2"4
The state can play a valuable role in other ways, through mandatory
disclosure requirements, handling verification, and fraud prosecution. New
Jersey, for example, requires disclosure of "the basis upon which [the]
representation is made" that a product is kosher." 5 In a similar vein, New
York requires all certifiers to register with the state.21 6 The government
might be in a better position to ensure proper handling of foods after
production but before sale; for example, private groups might certify the
slaughtering but rely on government regulations to ensure that the proper
meat is distributed to customers.2 7 Some commentators have suggested that
certain types of fraud prosecutions-based on objectively verifiable claims
rather than value-laden religious labels-might properly fall within the
realm of government enforcement.21 In fact, many kashrut organizations
213. See, e.g., Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass'n of Am., 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997)
(involving an effort by OK to seek an injunction to prevent the use of a half-moon-K on the
grounds that it could be confused with its circle-K); Storck USA, L.P. v. Levy, No. 90 C 5382,
1991 WL 244535 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1991) (involving a suit by OK for unauthorized use of ts
symbol). For a critical analysis of the former case, see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, KOA Is
A.O.K.: The Second Circuit's Recent Kosher Trademark Decision Further Illustrates that the
Patent and Trademark Office Must Answer to a Higher Authority, 22 COLUJM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs
203, 213 (1998), which asserts that kosher consumers are "sophisticated" and therefore unlikely
to be confused by similar marks.
214. Cf. Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1366 (N.J. 1992) ("The
enforceability of [mandatory disclosure requirements] would inhere in the notion that they simply
would compel [the merchant] to perform a secular obligation to which he contractually bound
himself by virtue of the fact that merchant represents food as being kosher." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (first alteration added)). A stark example of how this works in practice
is the supervision of kosher foods produced in China. See Craig S. Smith, This Rabbi's Mission:
Making Sure China Is Keeping It Kosher, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (describing the efforts
of a Canadian Hassidic rabbi to ensure strict adherence to kosher standards in a Chinese factory).
215. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-63 (West Supp. 1998). This approach was suggested by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. See Ran-Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1365. Similar statutes have
been proposed by commentators. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 89, at 71-72 (describing a model
"Kosher Labeling Law"). A failed federal bill proposed in 1990 would have required disclosure
for any religious food claims (which, in addition to kashrut, would have covered Muslim halal
standards). See Public Disclosure of Religious Dietary Certification Act, H.R. 5447, 101st Cong.
(1990).
216. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW § 201-e(3) (McKinney 1991). This requirement
includes the non-trademarked K. See id. at § 201-e(3-a); cf. supra note 201 (discussing the status
of the plain K in the kosher community).
217. See Greenawalt, supra note 105, at788 n.31.
218. For example, Kent Greenawalt compares state enforcement of supervision claims to the
claim that a cross was "Personally Blessed by the Pope," a claim that has objective meaning even
in a strictly secular society. See id. at 790. Gerald Masoudi makes a similar distinction between a
claim that "a vial of water has come from the Dead Sea" and "the vial of water [has] been
declared by God to be healing water." Masoudi, supra note 95, at 690.
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refer matters of fraud to state authorities, and thus serve as informal kashrut
investigators.219
This private-public hybrid allows the market to determine kashrut
standards. In fact, hundreds of certifiers compete, supervising different
definitions of kosher for various segments of the community. Private
companies also can respond to market preferences rapidly and efficiently;
governments, by contrast, are often slowed by formal procedures and
bureaucratic inertia.
B. Applying the Kosher Model to Organic Food
The kosher and organic communities share a key feature-
heterogeneity-and the kosher market has solved the difficulties that this
poses by resorting to a private-public hybrid enforcement regime. I argue
in this Section that the same policies ought to be pursued in the organic
market.
1. Organic Certification Organizations
Over thirty-three private organic certification organizations exist in this
country, covering a wide range of products."22 Like their kashrut
counterparts, these organizations work on different geographic scales and
cater to diverse sectors of the organic community. For example, the
Demeter Association, which certifies biodynamic and organic farms, is
highly respected in the general organic community.22' In keeping with the
organic emphasis on local production and consumption, many of these
organizations confine their activities to limited regions. The Northeast
Organic Farming Association, a federation of seven independent state
chapters, exemplifies this behavior.222 Nevertheless, general standards are
often developed on a larger scale. Groups such as the internationally
respected International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
accredit certification organizations that meet their requirements.2" This
process allows smaller organizations to draw on the credibility of a known
authority while retaining the degree of autonomy necessary to function
219. See, e.g., Jonathan Slonim, Kosher Certifiers Say Violations Are on the Rise, FORWARD,
June 27, 1997, at 2 ("[A]n OU representativeo said more than 100 instances of fraudulent
mislabeling had been reported to the OU last year, some even forcing the OU to resort to court
action.").
220. See National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,850, 65,914 (1997) (proposed 7 C.F.R.
pt. 205).
221. See supra note 77. Demeter also certifies organic farms in transition to, but not yet,
biodynamic. See Demeter Letter, supra note 73, at 1.
222. See NOFA Interstate Home Page (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.nofa.org>.
223. See IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 9.
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effectively. Accreditation also preserves some separation between the
formulators and implementers of organic standards, which may provide a
structural check against gross abuses.224 The details of the relationship are
contractual and therefore negotiable.
In this regime, the market sets organic standards. Consumers define the
term "organic" by purchasing food that meets their ethical concerns.' For
example, a consumer solely interested in the health benefits of organic food
might not be interested in whether the food was also produced in
accordance with the U.N. Human Rights Charter; other consumers,
however, might see this as essential to their decision to purchase organic.
226
These differing preferences could be accommodated by two certification
organizations, one focusing only on health issues and one addressing
broader factors.'27
Ultimately, this system depends on consumers' trust of the certification
process. Organic producers currently sell directly to local consumers largely
on the basis of a trust relationship.228 By adopting the standards of IFOAM
or another authority, a certifier could begin to establish this relationship
with the larger public.229 Of course, it would be free to establish its own
standards, in accordance with whatever values it thinks desirable. Internet
sites, which allow an organization to publicize easily the details of its
policies, provide another opportunity to build consumer loyalty210 In fact,
the certification seal could include the address of the organization's Web
site, which would allow concerned consumers to obtain more information
224. See Letter from Farm Verified Organic, Inc. to Lisa Grove & Don Hulcher 2 (Jan. 15,
1998) (on file with The Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter Farm Verified Organic Letter]; IFOAM
Letter, supra note 17, at 9.
225. Although the Establishment Clause concerns in the domain of kashrut, see supra notes
148-151 and accompanying text, do not apply with the same force to organic foods, I would argue
that their spirit should counsel similar governmental restraint in this case.
226. Cf. supra text accompanying note 49 (quoting IFOAM's definition of organic, which
includes human rights concerns).
227. One organization could also administer two separate organic programs with separate
seals. Indeed, the Demeter Association certifies both biodynamic and organic farms. See supra
text accompanying note 221.
228. See Brian Halweil, USDA Organics, 100% Farmer-Free, WORLD WATCH, MarJApr.
1998, at 2 (noting that in the "face-to-face commerce of farmers' markets and community-
supported agriculture... mutual trust typically supersedes regulation").
229. See Mort Mather, What Is Organic Food?, MOTHER EARTH NEWS, AugJSept. 1998, at
34. Some of IFOAM's standards are discussed supra text accompanying note 49.
230. See, e.g., California Organic Certified Farmers, Certification Standards (visited Jan. 1,
1999) <http://www.ccof.org/certification_standards.htm> Kosher organizations, too, have begun
to take advantage of the new information technologies. For example, the OU now posts updates
on the kashrut of products on the Web, and even e-mails them to consumers. See Orthodox Union,
5759 OU Kosher Alerts (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.ou.org/kosher/alerts>.
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without overwhelming other purchasers with details. A certifier would also
benefit from a reputation for vigilant and uncompromising enforcementY 1
In addition, other members of the organic community can help to police
the certifying organizations. Some of these organizations operate on a non-
profit basis. Volunteers are crucial to the success of many certifiers.uz
These people have a stake in the integrity of the certification process. They
can be expected to help disseminate information about practices to other
organic producers and consumers, much in the same way that rabbis and
other community leaders do in the kosher market.
2. Kosher and Organic Markets Compared
Is the organic community strong enough to be self-regulating, as the
kosher market is? The kashrut regime, after all, builds on the close-knit
community already created through a shared religion. A hint of analogous
structure in the organic community, however, may be gleaned from the way
a record number of people were mobilized to respond to the USDA's
proposed rule. 3 In particular, more than half of the comments came as
form letters distributed by various organizations.' These numbers show
that organic consumers read organic magazines, 35 belong to organic food
cooperatives, 6 shop at organic markets,' 7 and even share long distance
and credit card companies." Most importantly, this diffuse network
functioned as a source of information about the proposed rule. It is thus
conceivable that organic consumers see themselves as sharing a common
identity with others who make the same choices.
Moreover, it is not necessary that every organic consumer be fully
informed and conscientious. A core, committed group may be able to
protect standards for the whole industry, because it is these consumers who
231. Cf. Demeter Letter, supra note 73, § 1.2, at 2 ("Consumers are accustomed to looking
for certain seals and logos and find their use valuable for making an informed choice of
products.").
232. See id. § 1.1, at 1 (claiming that farmers have contributed "thousands of hours of
volunteer labor" to develop organic standards and certification programs): Farm Verified Organic
Letter, supra note 224, at 3 (noting the "enormous amount of volunteer work" that drives the
certification industry).
233. See supra note 180.
234. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., supra note 180.
235. More than 17,000 readers of Organic Gardening submitted the comment that the
magazine had printed. See U.S. Dep't of Agrie., Form Letter Page (visited Mar. 3, 1999)
<http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/forms.htm>.
236. For example, the Onion River Food Co-op in Burlington, Vermont, generated nearly
1,000 comments. See id.
237. For instance, nearly 1,000 customers of the Harvest Cooperative Supermarkets in the
Boston area commented. See id.
238. More than 35,000 customers of Working Assets, a socially responsible firm that offers
long distance and credit card services, submitted comments. See id.; cf. Working Assets (visited
March II, 1999) <http://www.wald.com>.
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are most likely to be reliable organic purchasers, and hence the most
desirable constituency for producers and certifiers. In other words, organic
producers will tend to target their products to the most loyal segment of the
market. One example of such a core group might be biodynamic
practitioners, who adhere to extremely rigorous organic standards. Compare
this with kashrut: Orthodox Jews constitute a small minority of kosher
consumers, but the vast majority of certification organizations adhere to
Orthodox standards. 239
There are, to be sure, significant differences between the kosher and
organic communities. One might argue that religious beliefs run deeper
than environmental ethics and that rabbis therefore would be (or at least
would seem) more trustworthy than organic certification organizations. It
is important to note, however, that profits and business drive some (but not
all) motivations in both industries. Indeed, kosher consumers' strong
skepticism of many certification marks is evidence that mere religious ties
are not enough to ensure integrity. The sense of community is crucial to the
kosher and organic markets, and there are opportunities to build it in both.
3. The Role of Government
As with kashrut, there is ample room for government action in the
organic regime. At a minimum, contract and trademark laws enable private
certifiers to enforce their standards. But public law might also promote
information, research, and education.2' In particular, a mandatory
disclosure requirement, in the same vein as New Jersey's kashrut law,24
would facilitate a system of private certification. In fact, a uniform federal
disclosure-law might beneficially preempt inconsistent state regulations,
thereby promoting freer trade of organic food.242
Fraud laws also play an important role in policing private certification.
Producers who use objectively false labels can be prosecuted. Thus, for
example, it would not be problematic for the government to enforce a "non-
239. See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 87, at 20 (noting that only one region of the
Rabbinical Assembly in the world provides "formal Conservative kashrut supervision.") An
analogous effect has been noted with respect to automobile emission standards: Historically,
California's lower permitted levels have been met by manufacturers and then become the basis for
new, stricter federal standards. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (1995) (describing the "California
effect").
240. See, e.g., IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 11 (suggesting that government policy be
directed toward "environmental and resource conservation, rural development, and agricultural
research").
241. See supra text accompanying note 215.
242. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 158 & 162 (discussing the interstate commerce
rationale for uniform organic standards).
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irradiated" label.243 Specific, verifiable claims, then, would subject a
certification to more exacting oversight. As mentioned above, the need to
build trust is likely to drive certifiers to make their standards transparent
and detailed;2  in this way, fraud laws can foster trust. Organizations are in
fact starting to make more specific claims: For example, "Salmon Safe"
agriculture, "Turtle Safe Shrimp", and "Predator Friendly Wool" labels
now replace or supplement the organic label on some products.245
Finally, there would be less reason for concern about a mandated
"baseline" standard, which established minimum requirements for an
organic label. If all (or the vast majority) of organic producers and
consumers agreed on some principles, such as prohibiting all use of
synthetic pesticides, the government might appropriately consider these to
be incorporated into the meaning of organic. Of course, this approach
would still allow for a great deal of variance among certification standards,
as an organization could choose to require more than the government
minimum. In fact, this has been the approach of many states, including the
successful California organic program.'
Organic consumers are, like kosher consumers, capable of exercising a
healthy degree of skepticism about unsubstantiated claims. Eliminating
their right to make ethical choices in the name of consumer protection is
bad policy and ultimately detrimental to the burgeoning organic industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed federal rule failed to "tak[e] into account the
fundamental principles and practices of organic agriculture and [to]
consider[] the international context" 247 in which organic food production
occurs. More seriously, however, it effectively would have destroyed the
burgeoning certification regime by mandating uniformity. This provision,
designed to facilitate interstate and international commerce by fully
harmonizing all requirements, sacrificed the ethical pluralism that makes
the kosher certification regime so effective. In doing so, it stifled
243. Cf. supra text accompanying note 218 (discussing a similar situation with religious
claims).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 229-231.
245. See Daniel Imhoff, Beyond Organic: Farming with Salmon, Coyotes, and Wolves,
SIERRA, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 24.
246. See Bones, supra note 14, at 411 (noting that California's program requires only limited
state involvement); id. at 417 (noting California's reliance on private certification organizations).
247. IFOAM Letter, supra note 17, at 2. The letter also notes that the rule borrowed the risk-
assessment techniques used in mandatory programs and inappropriately applied them to the
voluntary, organic program. See id. at 3 (" Mhe Proposed Rule would actually promote the
deterioration of ecosystems by requiring proof [of environmental degradation] .... The organic
system, in contrast, seeks to avert damages before they occur.")
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innovation,248 created perverse incentives for the industry,249 and ran afoul
of international law.
It is easy for those concerned about confusion and uniformity to
propose a regulatory solution, but such a policy can impair ethical
decisionmaking. Privately driven certification, on the other hand, promotes
the health of the kosher and organic markets: It continuously forces
producers and consumers to reevaluate their commitments and pay close
attention to the food that they eat-thereby serving the ultimate goals of
both systems.
248. See id. at 7 (arguing that the right to set higher standards "permits timely responses to
the development of new consumer demands" and "is the motor for continuous improvement and
innovation of the organic guarantee system through fair competition in the marketplace").
249. Fixed standards mean that a competitive advantage is given to those producers who do
only the bare minimum but still collect the full premium. Heterogeneous standards, by contrast,
allow certifiers to publicize their differences and compete for the loyalities of both consumers and
producers.
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